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Can ‘Medical Futility’ Conflicts be Mediated? 
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Mr Justice Francis ended his judgment in Great Ormond Street Hospital v. Yates, Gard and 
Gard with the recommendation that ‘mediation should be attempted in all cases such as this 
one’. Although this gave the impression that mediation would be unquestionably beneficial in 
the Gard case and other ‘medical futility’ cases where the patient is incompetent, this paper 
contends that this is not as straightforward as it might at first appear. With the general 
absence of a middle ground and with the law in such cases frequently on the doctors’ side, 





The high-profile case of Charlie Gard1 journeyed through several courtrooms in the first half 
of 2017. From the High Court2 to the Court of Appeal,3 then the Supreme Court4 and the 
European Court of Human Rights,5 the case returned to the High Court in July 2017.6 All 
agreed that it was not in Charlie’s best interests for life-sustaining treatment (LST) to be 
continued and that his doctors’ application for an order for LST to be withdrawn was granted. 
As the case progressed through the court system, it triggered an unprecedented degree of 
public attention not just in the UK but also from abroad, thus turning the case into ‘a global 
                                                          
1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Charlie, the way he was referred to in the law reports. 
2 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates, Gard and Gard [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam). 
3 Yates and Gard v Great Ormond Street Hospital and Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410. 
4 Judgement of the UK Supreme Court in the Case of Charlie Gard, 19 June 2017. 
5 Gard and Others v The United Kingdom [Application number 39793/17], 27 June 2017. 
6 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates, Gard and Gard [2017] EWHC 1909 (Fam). 
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phenomenon’.7 The public opinion was deeply divided. Some were in support of the judicial 
rulings and Charlie’s doctors and others sided with Charlie’s parents who took a radically 
different view of Charlie’s best interests. Over £1 million were raised through crowdfunding 
to enable Charlie to be treated abroad,8 and there were also offers of free treatment received 
from hospitals in the USA9 and Italy.10 Several of the parents’ supporters, however, showed 
little restraint in their condemnation of the medical team. In addition to public demonstrations 
outside the courts and the Great Ormond Street Hospital (GOSH) where Charlie was treated, 
abuse and even death threats have reportedly been hurled at the hospital staff.11 Against this 
background, it is hardly surprising that an alternative method of resolving the dispute was 
suggested. Hence when the case went back to the High Court for the second time, Mr Justice 
Francis repeated the advice he gave when the case first arrived at the High Court12 that 
‘mediation should be attempted in all cases such as this one’.13  
                                                          
7 A. Mostrous, ‘Charlie Gard: Publicity That Was Not Always in the Family’s Interests’, The Times, 29 July 
2017. 
8 N. Khomami, ‘Charlie Gard Parents Set Up Foundation with £1.3m of Donations’, The Guardian, 15 August 
2017. 
9 B. Kentish, ‘Charlie Gard: US Hospital “Offers Free Treatment” to Terminally Ill Baby After Donald Trump 
Intervenes’, The Independent, 4 July 2017. 
10 H. Horton, ‘Pope’s Hospital Offers to Take Care of Charlie Gard’, The Telegraph, 4 July 2017. 
11 Whilst death threats and violence towards doctors are not unknown in some parts of the world, it has hitherto 
been rare in this country – see e.g. P. Ambesh, ‘Violence Against Doctors in the Indian Subcontinent: A Rising 
Bane’ (2016) 68(5) Indian Heart Journal 749; T. Hesketh, ‘Violence Against Doctors in China’ (2012) 345 
British Medical Journal e5730; K. Sidika et. al., ‘Violence Against Doctors and Nurses in Hospitals in Turkey’ 
(2016) 12(1) Journal of Forensic Nursing 26. Yet, this case seemed to have unleashed a dangerous precedent 
when the same abuses were subsequently seen in the case of Alfie Evans – A. Griffin, ‘Alfie Evans: Medical 
Experts Speak Out About “Guerrilla Warfare Tactics” Being Used Against Family and Doctors’, The 
Independent, 26 April 2018. 
12 See Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates, Gard and Gard [2017] EWHC 972 (Fam) at para. 130. 
13 Great Ormond Street Hospital v Yates, Gard and Gard [2017] EWHC 1909 (Fam) at para. 20.  
3 
4. Kartina Choong 
The favouring of mediation over litigation is not difficult to see. It is widely credited with 
offering disputants a positive and constructive conflict resolution experience.14 This stands in 
sharp contrast to the distressing experience of most litigants. As is commonly known, the 
rights-based approach to dispute analysis polarises claimants and defendants.15 The 
courtroom becomes a gladiatorial arena where their legal representatives focus on securing a 
victorious verdict for their clients, often by discrediting and attacking the other side.16 At the 
end of what can be a costly, distressing and protracted process, one party will be adjudged the 
winner. The consequence of this defeat is that the loser would usually be asked to pay 
compensation to the winner.17 After such an acrimonious and divisive process, the parties 
could find it difficult to maintain a relationship with one another. Mediation, on the other 
hand, focuses on both sides’ underlying interests and needs.18 It has a collaborative ethos 
which encourages the parties to identify common ground and work towards a mutually 
satisfactory outcome.19 The mediation forum has drawn praise for its ability to help the 
parties generate creative and flexible solutions to their dispute, rather than merely monetary 
compensation.20 It is far less expensive than litigation and is also less time-consuming.21 
Given its amicable and harmonious character, parties are more likely to preserve and sustain 
their relationship after the conflict is resolved.22  
                                                          
14 See e.g. S.F. Ali, Civil Mediation Reform: Efficiency, Confidence and Perceptions of Justice (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2018); J.M. Haynes, G.L. Haynes & L.S. Fong, Mediation: Positive Conflict 
Management (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004). 
15 M. King, et. al., Non-Adversarial Justice (New South Wales: The Federation Press, 2014) p. 1. 
16 R. Aldave, ‘Mediation Training: Turning Gladiators into Peacemakers’ (2000-2001) Experience 12. 
17 Ibid. 
18 S. Hardy & O. Rundle, Mediation for Lawyers (Sydney: Wolters Kluwer, 2010) p. 9. 
19 J.M. Haynes, et. al., Mediation: Positive Conflict Management (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
2004) p. 15. 
20 B. Clark, Lawyers and Mediation (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 2012) pp. 57-58. 
21 Ibid. 
22 D. Kolkey, et. al. (eds.), Practitioner’s Handbook on International Arbitration and Mediation (New York: 
JurisNet, LLC, 2012) p. 482. 
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As interesting as Mr Justice Francis’ recommendation is, he was by no means the first 
member of the judiciary to advocate the wider use of mediation in lieu of or as an adjunct to 
litigation. Indeed, three of the most prominent advocates of mediation in recent times include 
Lord Woolf,23 Lord Justice Jackson24 and Lord Neuberger.25 Further, neither is this the first 
time that its usage in the healthcare context has been encouraged, with high numbers of 
medical negligence claims channelled into mediation the last few decades.26 What is 
particularly intriguing and noteworthy about Mr Justice Francis’ statement is his 
recommendation for its usage in all cases like Charlie Gard’s, which can be interpreted 
broadly as medical futility conflicts involving patients who are incompetent either by reason 
of age and/or lack of consciousness or mental capacity. Be this to avoid the rift which the 
courtroom battle helped widen between family members and the medical team, and/or to 
prevent the spillage of the antagonism into the public sphere, the deployment of a less 
combative and more private setting like mediation seems sensible and even desirable. 
However, is mediation’s framework sufficiently capacious and elastic to embrace this subset 
of end of life dispute? 
To address the question, Part 2 will highlight the kinds of cases which fall within the 
umbrella term ‘medical futility’. It then identifies the unique characteristics which distinguish 
this setting from other civil and commercial cases. Part 3 will explore the two main 
challenges likely to be encountered in attempts to mediate these cases, namely the absence of 
a middle ground and having to negotiate in the shadow of the current law that is frequently on 
the side of doctors. Part 4 by assesses the viability of mediation as a useful and effective 
method for resolving conflicts in this context, by balancing some perceived benefits against 
those limitations.   
 
                                                          
23 Lord Woolf, Access to Justice: Final Report (London: The Stationery Office, 1996). 
24 Lord Justice Jackson, Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report (Norwich: The Stationery Office, 2010). 
25 Lord Neuberger, ‘Keynote Address: A View From On High’, Civil Mediation Conference, 12 May 2015. 
26 For discussion, see e.g. L. Mulcahy, ‘Can Leopards Change Their Spots? An Evaluation of the Role of 
Lawyers in Medical Negligence Mediation’ (2001) 8(3) International Journal of the Legal Profession 203; L. 
Mulcahy et. al., Mediating Medical Negligence Claims: An Option for the Future? (London: The Stationery 
Office, 2000); NHS Resolution, Delivering Fair Resolution and Learning from Harm: Our Strategy to 2022 
(April 2017). 
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2. Medical Futility  
From the Latin word ‘futilis’ meaning ‘leaky’,27 futility refers to actions which produce no 
useful result.28 In the medical context, further treatment is regarded as futile and should not 
be attempted when, as a consequence of irretrievable illness or injury, it is clinically assessed 
as not being able to improve the patient’s condition.29 The concept itself is as old as 
medicine.30 According to the Hippocratic corpus, ‘[w]henever the illness is too strong for the 
available remedies, the physician surely must not expect that it can be overcome by 
medicine… To attempt futile treatment is to display an ignorance that is allied to madness’.31 
This idea that ‘enough is enough’32 regained significance in the last few decades. With the 
increasing availability of sophisticated medical technology and treatment options in modern 
hospitals, failing organs either through trauma, disease or old age no longer spell the end of 
one’s life. These have enabled corporeal existence to be sustained even when the patients 
may have lost relational ability and conscious appreciation of their surroundings.33 In some of 
these circumstances, the medical team may be of the opinion that LST should be withdrawn 
and the patient be allowed to die. Or that extraordinary life-saving interventions should not be 
attempted. This, they believe, would prevent the prolongation of the dying process or causing 
undue pain and suffering prior to death.34 The resources sustaining the patient’s life can then 
be used to benefit other patients.35  
                                                          
27 D. Sokol, ‘The Slipperiness of Futility: When Clinicians Deem an Intervention to be Futile, What Do They 
Actually Mean?’ (2009) 338 British Medical Journal b2222. 
28 Scanlon, A. & Murphy, M., ‘Medical Futility in the Care of Non-Competent Terminally Ill Patient: Nursing 
Perspectives and Responsibilities’ (2014) 27(2) Australian Critical Care 99.  
29 J. L. Bernat, ‘Definition, Determination, Disputes in Critical Care’ (2005) 2 Neurocritical Care 198. 
30 L. J. Schneiderman, ‘Defining Medical Futility and Improving Medical Care’ (2011) 8 Bioethical Inquiry 123 
at 124. 
31 Ibid.  
32 E.D. Pellegrino, ‘Decisions at the End of Life – The Abuse of the Concept of Futility’ (2005) 1(3) Practical 
Bioethics 3 at 4. 
33 N. Dubler, ‘Conflict and Consensus at the End of Life’ (2005) Hastings Center Report S19. 
34 A. Scanlon & M. Murphy, op. cit., p. 99.  
35 A. Bagheri, Medical Futility: A Cross-National Study (London: Imperial College Press, 2013) p. 210. 
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Medical futility cases that have courted the most attention in this country are those that relate 
to disorders of consciousness. This is mainly because those cases have, up until August 
2018,36 required court approval whether or not family members agree with the doctors’ 
decision regarding the removal of LST from patients in a permanent vegetative state (PVS) 
and a minimally conscious state (MCS).37 But medical futility cases are not, of course, 
confined to these instances. These are situations where doctors may consider it medically 
inappropriate or inadvisable for terminally ill patients or those in intensive case to be given 
interventions like chemotherapy, radiotherapy, cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), 
dialysis, transfusions, transplant or surgery.38 There are also situations, like the Gard case, 
where experimental treatments are assessed as not likely to be successful for such patients. 
And presumably the ultimate in medical futility is the continued ventilation and treatment of 
those diagnosed as brain stem dead.39 Suffice it to say that there are numerous scenarios 
which can come under the category of medical futility.  
                                                          
36 Following an NHS Trust and Others v Y (by his Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor) and Another [2018] 
UKSC 46, withdrawal of LST can now proceed without application to the court if family members and medical 
team agree on the best interests of the patient. The Supreme Court nevertheless made clear that where doubt 
exists as to the way forward, or where there is a difference of medical opinion or where those with an interest in 
the patient’s welfare disagree with a proposed course of action, a court application can and should indeed be 
made – per Lady Black at para. 125. 
37 See ‘Practice Direction E – Applications Relating to Serious Medical Treatment’ para. 5(a)(which 
supplements Part 9 of the Court of Protection Rules 2007).  
38 V.M. da Cruz, et. al., Factors Associated with Futile End-of-Life Intensive Care in a Cancer Hospital (2014) 
32(3) American Journal of Hospice and Palliative Medicine 329; J.M. Steiner, et. al., ‘Moral Distress at the End 
of a Life: When Family and Clinician Do Not Agree on Implantable Cardioverter-Defibrillator Deactivation’ 
(2018) 55(2) Journal of Pain and Symptom Management 530; M. Linecker, et. al., ‘Potentially Inappropriate 
Liver Transplantation in the Era of the “Sickest First” Policy – A Search for the Upper Limits’ (2018) 68(4) 
Journal of Hepatology 798; A.C. Kidd, et. al., ‘Does Medical Futility Matter in “Do Not Attempt CPR” 
Decision-Making?’ (2014) 68(10) International Journal of Clinical Practice 1190; M. Cardona-Morrell, et. al., 
‘Non-Beneficial Treatments in Hospital at the End of Life: A Systematic Review on Extent of the Problem’ 
(2016) 28(4) International Journal for Quality in Health Care 456. 
39 F.G. Miller, ‘Medical Futility and “Brain Death”’ (2017) 60(3) Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 400.  
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Conflicts arise when family members disagree with the doctors’ decision to withdraw LST or 
to abandon life-saving or life-prolonging interventions. There are many underlying factors of 
their objection. These include their feelings of helplessness; refusal to give up or to abandon 
the patient; a strong belief in the potential of modern medicine; and concerns about incorrect 
diagnosis and prognosis or with the medical assessments that those procedures would be 
unsuccessful or worthless.40 Further, they could be immobilised by fear, denial, mistrust of 
the medical team or even grief, to the point where they are unable to accept the patient’s 
terminal condition.41 Their opposition could also be on the grounds of religion whereby they 
may believe that death is the prerogative of God rather than doctors; and/or that religion 
dictates that all efforts should be expended to honour the sanctity of life.42 Hence, 
continuation of treatment which doctors deemed unwarranted may be significant for the 
family’s religious commitment and observance.43 They may also try to be respectful to the 
patient’s known or previously expressed beliefs, wishes and values about treatment 
limitation.44 These, which may align with their own culturally-held perspective on what 
would be acceptable, beneficial or valuable, may be at variance with those of the medical 
team. Aggressive measures which the doctors consider medically inappropriate may be 
acceptable to the patient or his/her family.45 Likewise, a final curative procedure which 
doctors regard as unnecessary may be deemed as a worthy effort to prolong life.46 Some 
                                                          
40 D.J.C. Wilkinson & J. Savulescu, ‘Knowing When to Stop: Futility in the Intensive Care Unit’ (2011) 24(2) 
Current Opinion in Anesthesiology 160; A. Scanlon & M. Murphy, op. cit., p. 102. 
41 E. Waldman, ‘Bioethics Mediation at the End of Life: Opportunities and Limitations’ (2014) 15 Cardozo 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 448 at 450. 
42 R.A. Ankeny, et. al., ‘Religious Perspectives on Withdrawal of Treatment from Patients with Multiple Organ 
Failure’, (2005) 183(11) Medical Journal of Australia 616. 
43 H. Akah, ‘Expanding the Scope of Bioethics Mediation: New Opportunities to Protect the Autonomy of 
Terminally Ill Patients’ (2016) Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution 73 at 74 & 97. 
44 Heland, M., ‘Fruitful or Futile: Intensive Care Nurses’ Experiences and Perceptions of Medical Futility’ 
(2006) 19(1) Australian Critical Care 25 at 27. 
45 Ibid., p. 29. 
46 S. Mohammed & E. Peter, ‘Rituals, Death and the Moral Practice of Medical Futility’ (2009) 16(3) Nursing 
Ethics 292 at 293. 
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families even come to the decision that chances of less than 1% are worth taking and life in a 
vegetative state is still worth living.47 Indeed, as expressed by one family member, her 
unconscious father would have taken the view that ‘any life is better than no life’.48 Thus for 
patients and their families, the choice of which medical options to follow is not always 
directed exclusively by medical determinants. Importantly, within the context of the NHS, 
they would also not have to be directly responsible for the cost of the continued care,49 i.e. for 
the result of their insistence that the medical team ‘pursue every avenue for extending life’50 
or their willingness to ‘try anything’.51 These conflicts over the future care of a loved one can 
easily escalate.52 But can they be successfully mediated?  
Mediation has been described in different ways by various parties. For purposes of this 
article, the description offered by the Civil Mediation Council (CMC) will be used. 
According to the Council, mediation ‘involves an independent third party – a mediator – who 
helps both sides come to an agreement’.53 As for the role of the mediator, this is to ‘help 
parties reach a solution to their problem and to arrive at an outcome that both parties are 
happy to accept’. The focus of a mediation meeting is therefore, the Council adds, ‘to reach a 
common sense settlement agreeable to both parties in a case’. The aim is to push disputants 
away from the courtroom unless the parties ‘are unable to reach agreement’.54 
                                                          
47 C. M. Bowser, ‘Exploring Nurses’ Attitudes About the Value of a Hospital Based Medical Futility Policy’ 
(2016) Master’s Theses, Dissertations, Graduate Research and Major Papers Overview, Rhodes Island College 
p. 7. 
48 Abertawe Bro Morgannwg University Local Health Board v RY & CP [2017] EWCOP 2, para. 5. 
49 H. McKenna, ‘Are We Expecting Too Much from the NHS?’, Joint Report by The Health Foundation; 
Institute for Fiscal Studies; The King’s Fund and The Nuffield Trust, 2018, p. 5. 
50 H. Akah, op. cit., p. 74. 
51 Yates and Gard v Great Ormond Street Hospital and Gard [2017] EWCA Civ 410, para. 112. 
52 K. Knickle, et. al., ‘Beyond Winning: Mediation, Conflict Resolution, and Non-Rational Sources of Conflict 
in the ICU’ (2012) 16 Critical Care 308. 
53 Civil Mediation Council, ‘What is Mediation?’ at http://www.civilmediation.org (accessed on 5th September 
2018). 
54 Emphasis added.  
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It is necessary to note that mediation of medical futility cases would hold a number of unique 
characteristics. First, since the patient is incompetent by reason of age and/or lack of 
consciousness or mental capacity,55 the mediation triad would be made up of the mediator, 
doctors and the patients’ parents or family members. Secondly, we are here dealing with 
time-sensitive decisions.56 From the families’ perspective, for a procedure or experimental 
treatment to have the best chance of helping their loved ones, it needs to be carried out as 
soon as possible.57 From the medical team’s point of view, the longer LST continues, the 
more the patient is subjected to preventable pain and suffering.58 Thirdly, it is also potentially 
far more emotionally charged than other civil and commercial cases including medical 
negligence conflicts, since the parties are ‘locked in a life or death struggle’.59 Family 
members may be embroiled in a wide range of strong emotions like grief, fear, anger, 
defiance and denial.60 Although they may have more invested in the outcome, the medical 
team too has strong feelings about providing care which they now believe is futile. They are 
known to be distressed and offended by the idea of providing inappropriate care,61 as they 
may not believe that medical practice should include the provision of measures which do 
nothing other than to maintain corporeal existence and mere biologic functioning.62 They 
may consequently find such practices wrong, gruesome, demoralising, inhumane, cruel, 
burdensome, abusive, degrading and obscene.63 With this in mind, the discussion now 
proceeds to the question of whether mediation can successfully be used to resolve such 
disputes.   
                                                          
55 Medical futility conflicts involving competent patients do not seem to be directly or indirectly addressed in 
Mr Justice Francis’ recommendation. It is therefore not within the scope of this paper.  
56 N. Dubler, op. cit., p. S25. 
57 D. Noll, ‘Bioethical Mediation: Peacemaking and End of Life Conflicts’ (2014), available at 
https://www.mediate.com/pfriendly.cfm?id=1549 (accessed 1 September 2018). 
58 M. Cardona-Morrell, et. al., op. cit., pp. 456-469. 
59 E. Waldman, op. cit., p. 469. 
60 A. Scanlon & M. Murphy, op. cit., p. 101. 
61 Ibid., p. 102. 
62 T.M. Pope & E.A. Waldman, op. cit., pp. 185 and 188. 
63 Ibid., pp. 188-189. 
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3. Challenges and Limitations  
Recent literature indicates that there are two main characteristics of medical futility cases 
which could impede mediation efforts: the absence of a middle ground; and having to 
negotiate in the shadow of current law that is frequently on the side of one party. These will 
be explored in turn.  
 
3.1 The Absence of a Middle Ground 
If mediation is supposed to be a conducive environment for the generation of creative options 
that will help the parties reach a solution they are happy to accept, this is not easily 
achievable in the futility context. The choices present themselves in stark terms: e.g., to 
continue or withdraw LST including artificial ventilation; attempt life-sustaining or life-
saving procedures or forego aggressive treatment options; allow the patient to be taken 
abroad for further care or to not allow the patient to be removed from hospital; and to 
undergo an experimental procedure or be prevented from doing so. How do they meet each 
other half way in those circumstances? After all, ‘extremism does not, in the crucible of 
conversation, give way to moderation’.64 It has been pointed out that the parties will instead 
cling on to their initial starting points and new creative options are not forthcoming.65 This is 
especially so where religion is at the heart of the conflict since these religious issues are often 
deemed as non-negotiable.66 As families have more at stake in the outcome yet they do not 
have to bear the cost of the LST should it be continued or the cost of life-saving or life-
prolonging interventions should these be attempted, these may breed intransigence on their 
part. At the same time, the medical team find it difficult to justify the continuation of medical 
care where it is not obvious that these can lead to any benefit for the patient. In the case of 
brainstem dead patients, doctors even view the provision of LST as merely to mechanically 
sustain a corpse.67  
                                                          
64 T.M. Pope & E.A. Waldman, op. cit., p. 158. 
65 Ibid., p. 155. 
66 G. Baeke, et. al., ‘Orthodox Jewish Perspectives on Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining 
Treatment’ (2011) 18(6) Nursing Ethics 835. 
67 J.M.A. Swinburn & S.M. Ali, ‘Discontinuation of Ventilation After Brain Stem Death: To Whom is Our Duty 
of Care?’ (1999) 318 British Medical Journal 1753. 
11 
4. Kartina Choong 
As there is no movement to middle ground, the outcome is predictable rather than creative. 
So, rather than having, as the CMC described, a mutually consensual agreement or solution 
which both parties are pleased to accept, one side will eventually have to acquiesce to the 
standpoint of the other, leading to a binary win-lose resolution just as in litigation. As to 
which party will usually have to give in, this is linked to the next point below concerning the 
impact of the existing legal framework on the bargaining power and behaviours of the parties. 
3.2. Negotiating in the Shadow of the Law 
Although mediation is a non-legal process, it is important to remember that it takes place ‘in 
the shadow of the law’.68 In other words, the parties negotiate against a backdrop of the likely 
outcomes if the dispute is litigated.69 This inevitably means that the party who anticipates a 
better outcome in court will have stronger bargaining power in the mediation.70 In the case of 
medical futility disputes, case law has shown that this is consistently the medical team rather 
than the patients’ family.  
Disorders of consciousness, where the patient is ‘dangling by a filament of consciousness’,71 
is clearly one such instance. When a patient is confirmed as being in a PVS, it has always 
been held that LST is ‘useless’.72 In other words, a diagnosis of PVS routinely leads to the 
conclusion that the continuation of LST is not in their best interests and can legally be 
withdrawn.73 Even for those who received a diagnosis of MCS, where withdrawal of LST is 
                                                          
68 R.H. Mnookin & L. Kornhauser, ‘Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce’ (1979) 88(5) 
Yale Law Journal 950. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Ibid., p. 997. 
71 J. Samanta & A. Samanta, ‘Awake and (Only Just) Aware? A Typology, Taxonomy, and Holistic Framework 
for Withdrawing Clinically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration in the Minimally Conscious State’ (2017) Medical 
Law Review, available at https://doi.org/10.1093/medlaw/fwx058 (accessed 1 October 2018). 
72 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] 1 All ER 821 per Lord Goff at 870. See also A NHS Trust v D [2006] 1 
FLR 638; Gloucestershire Clinical Commissioning Group v AB (by his Litigation Friend, the Official Solicitor), 
CD [2014] EWCOP 49; Cumbria NHS Clinical Commissioning Group v Miss S, Mrs D, Miss T [2016] EWCOP 
32. 
73 R.W.M. Law & K. Choong, ‘Disorders of Consciousness: Is A Dichotomous Legal Approach Justified?’ 
(2018) 25 European Journal of Health Law 1 at 19. 
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not automatically countenanced,74 cessation of care would be legally approved when LST is 
expected to cause intolerable suffering, with the matter determined from a medical 
perspective.75 There is statutory support for this position too. According to the Code of 
Practice of the Mental Capacity Act, ‘where treatment is futile, overly burdensome to the 
patient or where there is no prospect of recovery… it may be that an assessment of best 
interests leads to the conclusion that it would be in the best interests of the patient to 
withdraw or withhold life-sustaining treatment, even if this may result in the person’s 
death’.76  
Further, as is well known, in the case of Charlie Gard itself, where medical evidence indicates 
that there is no benefit to be attributed to an experimental treatment abroad that may even 
cause pain, suffering and distress to the patient, this was held to be tantamount to prolonging 
his existence in a manner which is no longer justified as being in his best interests.77 This was 
confirmed in the more recent case of Alfie Evans where the courts took the view that it was 
not in his best interests for LST to be continued for him to be taken abroad for this purpose, 
when the medical consensus was that his prognosis is futile.78 Importantly, just as in the case 
of disorders of consciousness and other futility cases, once an intervention is no longer in the 
patient’s best interests, doctors would not be in breach of a legal duty of care if they remove 
or withhold it from the patient.79 This is similarly the case in disputes relating to the diagnosis 
of death. This can be illustrated through the case of Re A (A Child),80 which despite its 
complex facts, did not receive any media coverage. This concerned a 19-month old boy who 
choked on a tiny piece of fruit and rushed to hospital where he was operated on and put on a 
ventilator. When he was subsequently confirmed to be brainstem dead, his doctors wanted to 
switch off the ventilator as they deemed the patient already medically and legally dead. The 
                                                          
74 Where a balance sheet exercise of the advantages and disadvantages of the continuation of LST would firstly 
be undertaken – see Aintree University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust v James [2013] UKSC 67. 
75 Ibid., para. 22. 
76 Department for Constitutional Affairs, Mental Capacity Act 2005: Code of Practice (London: The Stationery 
Office, 2007) para. 5.31. 
77 Judgement of the UK Supreme Court in the Case of Charlie Gard, 19 June 2017, para. 15. 
78 In the Matter of Alfie Evans No. 2, Supreme Court 20 April 2018.  
79 GMC, Treatment and Care Towards the End of Life: Good Practice in Decision Making (2010) p. 76. 
80 [2015] EWHC 443. 
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father protested as he disagreed that brainstem death equates the death of the person in Islam. 
He is originally from Saudi Arabia and wanted ventilation continued until at least the child 
can be repatriated to Saudi where he said ventilation would be continued. The court 
nevertheless held that the child was dead and doctors were allowed to remove the ventilation. 
If the case was mediated, as Mr Justice Francis’ statement seems to suggests that it can, it is 
important to remember that the law is on the doctors’ side as brainstem death has long been 
recognised as the legal definition of death.81 The case is also a reminder that to date, courts 
have never been willing to accommodate objections made to the withdrawal or withholding 
of LST on religious grounds.82   
The fact that the law relating to medical futility is frequently on the doctors’ side means that 
they can negotiate in the full knowledge that if no settlement or resolution is reached in the 
mediation, their standpoint is most likely to be supported by the courts based on past cases. 
The determinacy or predictability of court outcome thus gives doctors greater bargaining 
power. This does not create a mediation-friendly environment since mediation usually thrives 
in an environment where the legal outcome for both parties cannot be predicted with any 
degree of certainty.83 It is the uncertainty that would then lead them towards compromise in 
the hope of avoiding an unwelcome outcome or loss in litigation.84 Whereas in futility cases, 
doctors can effectively direct the outcome of the dispute as they do not need to make 
significant, or indeed any concessions.85 Given doctors’ strength of feeling on the provision 
of inappropriate care, they are likely to stand their ground and succeed. Thus, the LST is 
likely to withdrawn or life-saving or -prolonging procedures not carried out. Even in 
                                                          
81 Brainstem death has been recognised as the medical and legal definitions of death in British ICUs for the last 
few decades – see e.g. ‘Diagnosis of Death: Memorandum Issued by the Honorary Secretary of the Conference 
of Medical Royal Colleges and Their Faculties in the United Kingdom on 15 January 1979’ (1979) 1 British 
Medical Journal 332; R v Malcherek and R v Steel [1981] 1 WLR 690; Re A (A Minor) [1992] 3 Medical Law 
Review 303. 
82 See e.g. An NHS Foundation Trust v VT & A [2013] EWHC B26 (Fam); Abertawe Bro Morgannwg 
University Local Health Board v RY & CP [2017] EWCOP 2. 
83 T.M. Pope & E.A. Waldman, op. cit., p. 180. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid., p. 163. 
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situations where doctors continue with treatments as a consequence of acceding to the request 
of the family members or in compliance with a stay of a declaration for the withdrawal of 
LST, they do so not because they believe that the treatment is useful, but in order to stave off 
legal actions or to avoid media scrutiny86 whilst at all times considering it professionally 
wrong.87  
Thus, if the mediation process should, as the CMC claims, help both sides reach a common 
sense settlement agreeable to both parties, the discussion above has shown that this is 
difficult to attain in the futility context. In addition to having predictable and inflexible 
outcomes rather than creative ones which both parties are happy to accept, the process will 
also lead to a win-lose situation just as in litigation.  
 
4. Conclusion  
Mediation’s potential to resolve a wide range of disputes may have given the impression that 
it can be equally beneficial for the resolution of medical futility disputes. However, as 
discussed, this may be hindered by two main challenges: the absence of a middle ground; and 
having to operate against a backdrop where the law is firmly on the side of one party. 
This does not mean, however, that mediation is completely devoid of any positive value in 
this context. Significantly, it can provide the parties an opportunity to engage in a face-to-
face facilitated discussion.88 One clear benefit of this is that family members are given a 
chance to ventilate their emotions89 and express more fully their concerns to those who they 
actually feel need to hear it, especially the anger at what they may perceive as a premature 
abandonment of their loved ones.90 The process allows the doctors to express empathy for 
                                                          
86 A. Scanlon & M., Murphy, op. cit., p. 100. One healthcare practitioner described the challenge as follows: 
‘It’s really hard to even look at the patient half the time, and sometimes you even have to take a break from the 
patient, because you just can’t continue, it’s like a form of torture really”- see M. Heland, op. cit., p. 27.  
87 Judgement of the UK Supreme Court in the Case of Charlie Gard, 19 June 2017, para. 15. 
88 E.G. Howe, ‘Mediation Approaches at the Beginning or End of Life’ (2015) 26(4) Journal of Clinical Ethics 
275 at 277. 
89 E. Waldman, op. cit., p. 463. 
90 E.G. Howe, op. cit., p. 276. 
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their predicament and clarify the rationale91 for their own divergent views on the 
prolongation of life and the relief of suffering.92 Here, the doctors can learn how culture and 
faith inform the family’s worldview. Family members may seek clarifications and 
simplification of the medical situation so as to enable them to better understand the patient’s 
condition, situation and options.93 As insightfully observed by Dubler, ‘[a]t the end of life, 
short answers are inappropriate, only essays will do’.94 Not only can the process disperse any 
misperceptions, it can help decrease the asymmetry of knowledge, skill and experience 
between the two parties.95 As such interactions can help improve trust, they may be able to 
prevent the situation from disintegrating into an outbreak of hostilities.96  
Mediation should not, however, be asked ‘to do more than it is structurally equipped to 
handle’.97 It is not psychotherapy and cannot therefore rationalise magical thinking or 
overcome firmly maintained defences.98 Neither can, nor should, it be tasked with breaking 
through denials.99 When coupled with the two major limitations explored in Part 3 above, 
namely the absence of a middle ground and the presence of unequal bargaining power 
between the medical team and family members, could it be that Mr Justice Francis was overly 
optimistic about mediation’s potential when recommending its usage in this context?  
                                                          
91 For example, to explain that the provision of nutrients via a feeding tube can cause serious complications like 
skin breakdown, pneumonia, swelling of the arms and legs, constipation or loss of bladder control – see E. 
Waldman, op. cit., p. 464. 
92 D. Noll, op. cit. 
93 Ibid. This is particularly useful for concepts like brainstem death, for instance, which can be particularly 
difficult for non-medically trained people to grapple with – see A. Moorkamp, ‘Don’t Pull the Plug on Bioethics 
Mediation: The Use of Mediation in Health care Settings and End of Life Situations’ (2017) Journal of Dispute 
Resolution 219 at 235. 
94 N. Dubler, op. cit., p. S24.  
95 Ibid., p. S25. 
96 Ibid., p. S24. 
97 T.M. Pope & E.A. Waldman, op. cit., p. 151. 
98 Waldman, E., op. cit., p. 467.  
99 Ibid. 
